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Chapter 18: Genocide & State Sponsored Killing 
Andy Aitchison 
Word Count: 7984 
Abstract 
The chapter gives an account of genocide, linking this with the wider phenomenon of state 
sponsored killing. Firstly some of the key dimensions of genocide in legal and extra-legal 
scholarship are introduced, identifying points where differing interpretations of the crime 
emerge. The prevalence and distribution of genocide is examined in terms of a snapshot of 
the current situation, historical surveys and attempts to calculate the number dying in state 
sponsored killings. An account of different ways of thinking about victims and perpetrators 
leads in to a summary of explanatory frameworks, concluding with recent attempts to 
create multi-level, integrated explanations for genocide. Finally, the record of preventive 
action since 1948 is examined, suggesting some reasons for changes in the willingness to 
intervene during, or to prosecute after, genocidal episodes.  
Key words: Genocide, Intent, Groups, State, Individual, International, Law, Social and 
Political Science, History 
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Among the grievous crimes this Tribunal has the duty to punish, the crime of genocide is 
singled out for special condemnation and opprobrium. The crime is horrific in its scope; its 
perpetrators identify entire human groups for extinction. Those who devise and implement 
genocide seek to deprive humanity of the manifold richness its nationalities, races, 
ethnicities and religions provide. This is a crime against all of humankind, its harm being felt 
not only by the group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity.   
Prosecutor v Krstić 2004, paragraph 36 
While the human death in homicide is clear, the ‘death’ of a group is more ill-defined. 
Genocide differs from many other acts of homicide in this book in that killing is not a 
necessary element of the crime: preventing births or creating conditions in which a group 
cannot sustain itself would suffice. The word genocide, coined to define the widespread 
extermination of Jews and attacks on other groups in World War Two, draws political and 
emotional charge from its origins. Outside the courtroom the word carries “unmatched 
rhetorical power” (Kirsch 2013, 8), while courts declare the need for special condemnation 
(above). In this chapter, the meaning ascribed to genocide, generally a form of state-
sponsored killing but not the only form in that category1, is explored through law and other 
disciplines which treat it as a social or political phenomenon. The chapter analyzes ways of 
measuring the prevalence of genocide, recognizing that given differing interpretations of 
the concept, this will always be open to contestation. A brief account of victim groups, 
perpetrators and contexts is given and feeds into a section on explanations of how and why 
genocide happens. Finally, the chapter examines responses to genocide and the threat of 
genocide since the introduction of an international convention in 1948.  
                                                 
1 A number of forms of state sponsored killings exist short of genocide, ranging from individual assassinations 
through to mass killings that do not fit all the required elements of the crime. 
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Deconstructing genocide 
The term genocide is employed in a range of contexts. Firstly, in international criminal law; 
secondly, a broad area of scholarship, including political science, history and sociology, 
utilizes the term, developing it through analysis of empirical material; thirdly, the term may 
be employed in political, moral and lay discourse. Here I start by identifying the basic legal 
definition of genocide and interpretive issues around it. Subsequently, I examine 
employment of the term in social sciences including history.  
Genocide and law 
In 1946, two years after the term was created by Raphael Lemkin, genocide was recognized 
as a crime by the UN. Subsequently, in 1948 the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide was adopted by the UN. The definition of genocide in Article 2 
forms the basis of those of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the 
international criminal court and definitions of genocide in domestic jurisdictions2.  
                                                 
2 Individual states differ in terms of how they define genocide. Ethiopia, for example, went beyond the 
Convention to include attacks on political groups (see Tiba 2007, 517, fn 12).  
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Acts listed in article 2(a) through to article 2(e) may be covered by existing criminal law 
concerning homicide, assault, kidnapping and other offences. Genocide is first and foremost 
defined not by the individual acts, but by the preceding text on group destruction. Here, this 
is broken down in terms of the purpose (intent to destroy), the extent (in whole or in part), 
and the nature of collectives (a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such).  
Intent to destroy 
Genocide requires two levels of intentionality. Firstly, any of the acts covered by Article 2 (a) 
through (e) must be committed with a clear intent to kill, cause serious harm, prevent births 
and so on. Secondly, acts must be committed with the intent, referred to as special or 
specific intent, that they are not only completed, but they make a contribution to group 
Box 1 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Article  2 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
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destruction3. While there may be occasions when statements indicate such genocidal 
intent4, it may also be inferred from indirect evidence. The case against Popović and others 
gives examples. Not all determine intent on their own, but taken together support such a 
finding. They include sustained or repetitive action of a systematic nature, coordination, 
evidence of preparation, individual knowledge of a plan, and use of discriminatory and 
derogatory terms for victims5.  
Behrens (2012, 509) offers an analysis of the relationship between intent and motive in 
genocide, one of the most hotly debated issues in the field. He notes that mainstream 
thinking in international tribunals goes beyond understanding intent as evident in a 
suspect's awareness of a campaign or risk leading to destruction, but includes a volitional 
element closer to motive (the underlying individual purpose of an offender). This fits with 
Greenwalt's interpretation of a narrow reading of special intent as purposive (1999, 2279 
ff.). He argues for a broader reading, where intent is based on an offender's knowledge of 
the destructive goals or effects of a set of actions in which he or she participates (1999, 
2288). Behrens concludes that the effect of the Genocide Convention is to translate “specific 
genocidal intent” into a “codified primary motive”, in turn demanding particular evidence.  
In whole or in part 
Intent is defined in relation to destruction of a group in whole or in part, requiring courts to 
analyze, in quantitative and qualitative terms, when the intent to destroy part of a group 
constitutes genocide6. The quantitative dimension focuses on the extent of destruction in 
                                                 
3 Prosecutor v Tolimir 2012, paragraph 744. 
4 See Prosecutor v Karadžić, Rule 98bis Appeal, 11 July 2013, 78, line 17ff. 
5 Prosecutor v Popović et al, 2010, paragraphs 823, 830, 856-860 and 1177; on the importance of knowledge of 
a plan in the Eichmann conviction see also2010, paragraphs 823, 830, 856-860 and 1177; on the importance of 
knowledge of a plan in the Eichmann conviction see also Schabas 2008, 962.  
6 e.g. Prosecutor v Blagojević and Jokić 2005, 668. 
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absolute terms and in relation to the size of the group as a whole. The Rwandan tribunal 
judged that the numbers of Tutsi killed in individual communes, the widespread and 
systematic nature of killings, and the “undeniable scale” of massacres point towards 
“complete disappearance” of the victim group7. The frequently cited Semanza judgment 
makes it clear that there is no specific numeric threshold, but following Kayishema suggests 
that the part targeted for destruction must be “substantial”8.  
Qualitatively, subsets of a population, defined by social position or function, are of special 
significance to group continuity. A key element of genocide as defined by Lemkin is the 
“destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group” (1944, 79). Attacks on 
intellectuals and leadership who bear “national ideals” featured in German occupation of 
Poland, Bohemia-Moravia, and Slovenia (1944, 88-9). In Krstić, the trial chamber identified a 
campaign to kill all military-age Bosnian men in the Srebrenica enclave, evidenced by mass 
executions, a disregard for civilian or military status of those killed, and a “relentless” hunt 
for men trying to escape the area (2001, paragraph 546). In a patriarchal community, this 
was deemed to be of special significance and indicative of the intent to eliminate the 
Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica9. 
The nature of the collective 
Although genocide and homicide may overlap somewhat in individual killings of group 
members (Article 2(a)), the destruction of the collective gives genocide its specific meaning. 
The significance of the crime is rooted in the loss of the group felt at the level of humanity 
rather than the loss of any number of individuals (UNGA 1946). The groups protected by the 
                                                 
7 Prosecutor v Akayesu 1998, paragraphs 118, 704, 730.  
8 Prosecutor v Kayishema 1999, paragraph 89; Prosecutor v Semanza 2003, paragraph 316.  
9 Prosecutor v Krstić 2001, paragraphs 549-5; reiterated in Prosecutor v Krstić 2004, paragraph 19; see also 
Buss 2014 for a discussion of how women’s testimony was interpreted in relation to patriarchy.  
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convention are strictly limited under article 2 (“a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group”). The definition of the group has been considered by the international tribunals10, 
but it is also worth considering what it means to intend to destroy a group as a group. In 
Akayesu, the chamber considered the possibility of expanding the range of groups covered, 
and in doing so identified a key dimension of ‘groupness’, the stability and permanence of a 
social formation11. Judge Shahabuddeen, in an opinion attached to the Krstić appeal, goes 
further, and seeks to isolate the physical or biological form implied by the article 2 acts, 
from the intent with which these are carried out on a group which is more than physical or 
biological in its nature12. He infers that groups can be destroyed in ways other than 
physically or biologically, undermining intangible characteristics which bind the group. While 
cautious about endorsing concepts of cultural genocide, he recognizes that attempts to 
destroy culture may be indicative of intent “to destroy the group as such”13. This by no 
means exhausts the ways in which provisions of the Genocide Convention and the 
subsequent statutes of international tribunals construct the concept of genocide, but taken 
together the understanding of intent, extent and the nature of collectives gives a firm 
starting point. These issues continue to inform scholarship in history and in the political and 
social sciences.  
Genocide in historical, political science and social science scholarship 
Although the meaning of genocide is not settled in the courtroom, as a term it is designed 
primarily for legal rather than historical purposes (Bloxham 2003, 189). In other disciplines, 
efforts to define the term proliferate and no single widely accepted definition exists 
                                                 
10 For instance in Akayesu (1998, paragraph 702) the court identified the Tutsi as a protected ethnic group on 
the basis of ethnic categorisation on Rwandan identity cards and on witnesses’ ready identification as Hutu or 
Tutsi when asked their ethnicity.  
11 Ibid, paragraph 701.  
12 Prosecutor v Krstić 2004, paragraph 48 ff. 
13 Ibid, paragraph 53.  
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(Mennecke and Markusen 2003, 295). Jones (2006a: 15-18) gathers together definitions of 
genocide, partly replicated in table 1. They range from the short open statement from Henry 
Huttenbach (1988: 297), “any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy,” to 
others which delineate the nature of the perpetrators, victims, acts, intentionality or 
relationship between victim and perpetrator. Some of these features follow the concerns of 
legal scholars, but show significant differences emerging within non-legal scholarship and 
between legal and non-legal scholarship. For example, while the interpretation of intent is 
still an open question in international criminal law, it remains an essential element of the 
crime. Jones’ sources range from those disregarding intent (Huttenbach, above) to a 
number identifying acts as deliberate, planned, intended or purposeful. There is variation in 
relating the intent to individual acts targeting victims on the basis of group membership, but 
without an overall aim of group destruction (Drost), or to the planned destruction or total 
murder of groups (Bauer, Chalk and Jonassohn, Katz).  
Regarding victim groups, further differences emerge. Charny and Horowitz’s later work 
make no mention of a group, focusing on the scale of killing and respectively the 
defenselessness or innocence of victims. Others state that the target is a group or a 
collectivity, without further specifying (e.g. Drost, Fein), but this may be qualified as a 
minority (Dadrian, Horowitz’s earlier definition). A number specify the types of groups that 
are targeted, again with some specifying minority status. Variously these include economic, 
gender, ethnic, national, political, racial, religious, sexual, social or tribal groups (e.g. Porter, 
Bauer, Katz). Finally, a number of authors note that what matters is how the collective is 
defined by the perpetrator (Chalk and Jonassohn, Katz).  
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Table 1: Definitions of genocide14 
Author(s) Definition 
Bauer The planned destruction, since the mid-nineteenth century, of a racial, 
national or ethnic group as such, by the following means: (a) selective mass 
murder of elites or parts of the population; (b) elimination of national (racial, 
ethnic) culture and religious life with the intent of ‘denationalization’; (c) 
enslavement, with the same intent; (d) destruction of national (racial, ethnic) 
economic life, with the same intent; (e) biological decimation through the 
kidnapping of children, or the prevention of normal family life, with the same 
intent. 
Chalk and 
Jonassohn 
…one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy 
a group, as that group and membership are defined in it by the perpetrator. 
Charny The mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the 
course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, 
under conditions of the essential defencelessness of the victim. 
Dadrian The successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority 
and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce 
by coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate 
extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective vulnerability 
is a major factor contributing to the decision for genocide. 
Drost The deliberate destruction of individual human beings by reason of their 
membership of any human collectivity as such. 
Fein A sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a 
collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and 
social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender 
or lack of threat offered by the victim. 
Horowitz 
1976 
A structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state 
bureaucratic apparatus… a systematic effort over time to liquidate a national 
population, usually a minority…[functioning as] a fundamental political policy 
to assure conformity and participation of the citizenry. 
Horowitz 
1996 
A structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state 
bureaucratic apparatus… the physical dismemberment and liquidation of 
people on large scales, an attempt by those who rule to achieve the total 
elimination of a subject people.  
Huttenbach Genocide is any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy.  
Katz The actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in 
its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or 
economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever 
means. 
Porter The deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, by a government or its agents, 
of a racial, sexual, religious, tribal or political minority.  It can involve not only 
mass murder, but also starvation, forced deportation, and political, economic 
and biological subjugation. Genocide involves three major components: 
ideology, technology and bureaucracy/organization. 
 
                                                 
14 Extracted from Jones 2006a, 15-18. 
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As the legal definition of genocide shapes prosecutorial and defense strategies, and 
decisions on guilt, definitions employed in historical, social science and political scholarship 
impact upon analyses. Through the various features included, episodes are defined in or out 
of the genocide category. If the target group must be a minority, the 1972 mass killing of the 
Hutu majority by the Tutsi-dominated army in Burundi is excluded. Yet Lemarchand and 
Martin described the events as “systematic”, composed of a mixture of indiscriminate 
killings of Hutu along with particular elite groups (1974, 15), and ultimately leading to the 
aim of “the physical liquidation of nearly every educated or semi-educated Hutu” (1974: 18).  
Different rationales inform working definitions of genocide. Bauer values fidelity to the 
linguistic origins of the term, particularly as categories such as ethnicity, race or nationality 
offer little theoretical avenue of escape (1999: 35). Yet the perpetrator’s power to define 
group membership equally denies a lack of escape (e.g. Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). 
Campbell includes a limited number of elements in his definition and provides a framework 
allowing for variation and contradiction in genocidal episodes. For him, the ideal-typical 
genocide is “unilateral, ethnically-based mass killing” (2011, 589). His explanation focuses 
on differences in the intensiveness, the proportion of the target group killed, and scope, the 
temporal and geographical extent of killing. He associates the intensiveness of killing with 
the mobility of victim groups (2011, 592). In Bosnia, where transfer of Bosnian Muslims to 
government territory was possible, genocidal killing was more selective. The Srebrenica 
massacres of July 1995 concentrated on men, while women along with elderly and younger 
community members were expelled (2011, 592-3). The Holocaust shows variation over time, 
with expulsion and concentration of the Jewish population in early stages shifting towards 
extermination as options for separation became limited (Bloxham 2010). Campbell further 
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associates scope with inequalities in organization between perpetrators and victims (2011, 
593). By providing categorical flexibility, implied by ideal types, or by including associated 
phenomena in analysis15, scholars recognize that genocide stands at the extreme end of a 
continuum of collective violence. Ultimately, definitions are working tools and are 
formulated in line with research goals and questions, shifting as these develop.  
Prevalence and distribution of genocide 
Kuper suggests that genocide is “all too common” (1981, 9). Yet absent a formal body to 
investigate charges of genocide in 1981, he acknowledged problems with measurement. 
While homicides are measured through records held in national law enforcement agencies, 
there is no comparable system for reported genocides or other international crimes. A 
number of alternative approaches exist. The most simple might be a snapshot of ongoing 
genocidal processes. Genocide Watch (2014) currently list eleven countries that have 
reached the exterminatory phase16 of genocide (see table 2). A narrow interpretation 
reduces this to four or five involving a group or groups within the protected categories 
under the 1948 convention, and adds a recent ‘alert’ on the Central African Republic, where 
Genocide Watch identify exterminatory attacks by both Christian and Muslim forces.  
  
                                                 
15 See, for example, Fein 1990, 18, on including more sporadic ‘genocidal massacres’ alongside genocides . 
16 Extermination is stage 9 of a ten stage process, the final stage being denial of a genocide.  
12 
 
Table 2: Genocide Watch countries at exterminatory phase of genocide, October 201417 
Country Victim group(s) 
Burma/Myanmar Shan, Kachin, Karen, Rohinga 
Central African Republic Muslims, Christians 
Iraq Kurds, Shia, Sunni, Christians, Yazidis 
Nigeria (Borno) Christians 
Somalia Opposing clans 
Sudan Darfurese, Abyei, Nuba 
Afghanistan Government supporters 
Ethiopia Government opponents 
North Korea Government opponents 
Pakistan Government supporters 
South Sudan Civilians, women, children 
Syria Anti-government rebels 
 
Harff and Gurr (1988; 1989) provide a historical survey of the period for 1945 through to 
1988, subsequently reanalyzed by Fein (1993). This illustrates changes in the distribution 
and prevalence of genocide. Fein groups episodes as genocides and other state-sponsored 
massacres, and lists 16 genocides, some contained within one or two years, and others 
running across two or three decades18.  
  
                                                 
17 Shading indicates a victim group not covered by the 1948 convention. 
18 On the latter, attacks against multiple nationalities in the USSR between 1943 and 1968 and attacks on the 
Ache in Paraguay in the 1960s and 1970s.  
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Table 3: Genocides 1945-1988, Fein (1993) after Harff and Gurr 
Country Victim group(s) Period 
Burundi Hutu 1972-3 
Ethiopia Tigris/Eritrea 1983-4 
Rwanda Tutsi 1962-3 
Uganda (1) Multiple 1971-9 
Uganda (2) Multiple 1979-86 
Afghanistan Afghans 1980-9 
Cambodia Minorities, Khmer 1975-9 
China Tibetans 1956-60 
Indonesia (1) Communists, Chinese 1965-6 
Indonesia (2) East Timorese 1975-9919 
Pakistan Bengalis 1971-2 
Guatemala Mayan tribes 1980-84 
USSR 7 nationalities 1943-68 
Paraguay Ache 1960s and 1970s 
Iran Baha’is 1979-84 
Iraq Kurds 1987-8 
 
Fein’s list shows a number of things. Firstly there is not one year between 1945 and 1988 
without at least one government involved in genocide. The peak value is 6, and occurs in 
both 1983 and 1984. The data shows a general upward trend (figure 1), supporting 
Greenfield’s claim that genocide has become more common since the convention (2008, 
923). To Fein’s list, we might add another 17 governments listed by Charny for genocides 
against indigenous people in the same period (1999, 350, derived from table 1). Harff and 
Gurr suggest a ‘typical year’ during the period would feature six episodes of politicide or 
genocidal violence. As evident from table 2, the since 1988 mutliple genocidal processes 
continue to unfold. In terms of distribution, the events cover most continents, the exclusion 
                                                 
19 The situation was resolved in 1999 with a UN sponsored peacekeeping mission.  
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being Australasia20. Finally, it is worth noting that there are certain countries that appear 
repeatedly21.  
Figure 1: Governments involved in genocides 1945-1988, Fein (1993) after Harff and Gurr 
 
Rather than counting episodes, some estimate the numbers dying from organized state 
violence. Harff and Gurr (1988, 370) cautiously suggest that, since 1945, genocides and 
politicides combined probably cost as many lives as “all organized combat”. Reanalyzing 
their data, Fein (1993, 81) suggests that the figure may be as much as double that of wars 
and natural disasters. Rudolph Rummel estimates state-sponsored killings. He identifies the 
20th century as a period in which states have developed greater capacity to act arbitrarily 
towards their own and other populations, and introduces the terms megamurder, the killing 
of more than one million, and democide, encompassing genocide, politicide and mass-
murder (1992, 47). He claims democide accounted for nearly 151 million deaths between 
                                                 
20 But on a ‘continuing genocide’ against indigenous Australians, see Short (2010).  
21 Uganda and Indonesia (and going back to Harff and Gurr’s original list, the USSR which is listed for three 
separate episodes, 1989, 26, table 1). 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
n 10 year average
15 
 
1900 and 1987, and that 11 megamurderers account for over 142 million deaths, of which 
86 per cent took place in states with absolute power (1992, 48). His argument that 
democracy is a bulwark against genocide is supported by the selection of countries in tables 
2 and 3. 
The snapshot, historical survey, and efforts to quantify the number of victims reflect 
different ways of understanding the impact of genocide and other mass killing. The first two 
fit with a focus on the lost contribution of a group to humanity. The latter is closer to 
homicide, albeit on a massive scale. The focus on the period from 1945 onwards makes 
sense in terms of when the concept of genocide was introduced, and also gives a sense of 
modern genocides directed by states at their own citizens. This form is apparent earlier in 
the 20th century in the genocide of Armenians in 1915 (Bloxham 2003). It nonetheless hides 
different forms of genocide from ancient and colonial periods (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). 
While the logic of genocide may change over time, it is a longstanding phenomenon.  
Victims, genocidaires and contexts 
Victims 
Legal and extra-legal definitions of genocide identify specific social collectives as victims of 
genocide. There are two key ways in which the questions of victimhood might be examined. 
Firstly, features which make genocidal victimization of a group more or less likely. Secondly, 
within a group, characteristics likely to lead to particular sub-groups being victimized. It 
stands to reason that a victim group must be identifiable to its perpetrators (Kuper 1981, 
53). This may involve visual cues such as skin color (e.g. Darfur), cultural cues such as names 
(e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina), official identification (e.g. Rwanda) or other forms of 
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differentiation. Differentiation may be encouraged by state practices. The separation of 
German Jews from the rest of the population was achieved through law (Garner 1936, 96), 
ultimately undermining their social relations with other Germans (Stowell 1936, 103). This 
contributed to the exclusion of victims from a “universe of obligation” making their 
unopposed victimization more likely (Fein 1990, 34). Rafter and Walklate identify group 
features pertinent to victimization: the lack of the protection afforded by national 
statehood, lower legal protections through different forms of citizenship, and attempts to 
secure some form of autonomy.  
Within the target group, Article 2 acts of genocide may be directed at sub-groups in 
different ways. Jones writes on the risk to non-combatant battle-age males originating in a 
heteronormativity which casts them as a danger (2006b, 452). MacKinnon identifies that 
women are “violated in ways men are not, or that are exceptional for men”, primarily 
through rape and sexual murder (1994, 6). She goes on to show how state-sponsored rape 
contributes to genocide (1994, 11). In Akayesu, the chamber included rape in its 
deliberations on genocide under the heading of causing serious bodily or mental harm 
(1998, paragraph 731):  
These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their 
families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process 
of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to 
their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole. 
Perpetrators 
As with victims it is possible to think of perpetrators at the level of the collective (for 
example the state, or a state-like body) and individual. Gerlach has suggested that the focus 
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on state-crime has been driven by a European model of totalitarian state-bureaucracy, 
diverting attention from the complexity of extremely violent societies and the breadth of 
participation (2006, 458-60, 465). The extent of participation is underscored by Drumbl 
(2000, 1252) suggesting that roughly one third of adult Hutu participated in the Rwandan 
genocide. Thus, analyses of genocide involve accounting for conformity, albeit within the 
context of a ‘deviant normative order’ (Maier-Katkin et al 2009, 237). Schabas criticizes 
current case law for focusing too much on individuals at the expense of understanding their 
action “on behalf of a state and in accordance with a state policy” (2008, 954). Between the 
state and the individual lie other structures playing a supporting role in genocides. For 
example, Huisman (2010) identifies 70 corporations involved in crimes under international 
law, including genocide, either directly or as contributors or beneficiaries. Equally, a number 
of studies of semi-autonomous “sub-alterns” suggest that groups pursuing their own agenda 
contribute to the overarching genocidal aims of states (See Weiss-Wendt and Üngör 2011 
and Tanner and Mulone 2013. The role of intermediary organizations will be further 
explored under explanatory frameworks, below.  
Contexts 
The contexts in which genocide takes place bring together an empowered perpetrator and a 
vulnerable victim group in a suitable opportunity structure. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) 
provide a historical survey of genocides dating back to antiquity, identifying various contexts 
including war and colonization. Modern genocides are often located in contexts of social 
and political instability. Elias (1998, 23) examines the structural change and attendant status 
uncertainty in Germany following the First World War. Bloxham points to unstable and 
contested border zones as key contexts of genocides and mass anti-civilian violence in the 
three generations preceding the Holocaust, and within the Holocaust notes the vulnerability 
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of populations in territory changing hands (2010, 320 and 323). Harff and Gurr’s historical 
review suggests that the instability associated with decolonization is correlated with a spike 
in genocides and politicides in the period 1961-66 (1988, 367; see also Kuper 1981, 46). 
Many of the decolonizing territories were plural societies with enduring cleavages, 
exacerbated by colonial policy. Kuper identifies this as a structural base for genocide (1981, 
54-7). Local contextual factors also need to be accounted for, as is evident from Korb’s 
(2010) work on Ustaša violence in the Independent State of Croatia during the Second 
World War. Conversely the cases such as South Africa and Northern Ireland show apparently 
permissive factors such as cleavages, but without genocide (Kuper 1981, 191 ff.).  
Explanatory frameworks 
Explanatory frameworks for genocide address various questions: under what circumstances 
does genocide take place (Kuper 1981)? How do processes unfold in the short and long term 
(respectively Klusemann 2012 and Bloxham 2010)? How do seemingly ‘ordinary’ individuals 
come to participate in genocidal activity (Browning 2001)? Others treat genocide as an 
independent variable, asking how genocide impacts upon post-genocidal societies or 
exploring manifest and latent functions of genocide (Doubt 2000). Different disciplinary 
perspectives operate at a range of different levels. Political science tends to focus on the 
features of states in which genocide occurs (Rummel 1992), while psychological 
explanations focus on individual motivations (Wilson 2010) and the interactions of 
individual and context (Halsam and Reicher 2007). Recent work in history (Bloxham 2008) 
and criminology (Van Baar and Huisman 2012) has also sought to locate the individual in a 
social and political context, introducing mid-level phenomena such as groups and 
organizations into multi-level explanations of genocide. A further international level can be 
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factored into analyses. Each level of analysis will be discussed, before showing how they 
may be integrated.  
State (macro-) level analyses 
States with deep, longstanding cleavages are contextually conducive to genocide, but not all 
divided societies are genocidal and the nature of state power may be a further explanatory 
factor. Writing on state aggression, Durkheim linked this to an overly powerful unified state 
dominating civil society (1915. 30, 34). State power, unconstrained by democratic controls, 
is a common explanation of state involvement in genocide. Fein notes that genocidal states 
are most likely to be authoritarian, one party states (1999, 159). While no democratic state 
was directly involved in genocide from 1945 to 1988 (Fein 1999, 159), democratizing states 
may experience instability conducive to emerging genocidal regimes. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, free elections and multi-party rule the 1992-95 war. The process by which the 
Serb republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created and came to be dominated by one 
party shows the interplay of democracy and authoritarian legacies in processes running up 
to genocide.  
The international environment 
Karstedt underscores the importance of “connectivity within the international system and 
‘world politics’” (2013, 386). Two key aspects of the international environment are directly 
relevant to the occurrence of genocide. Firstly, international relations that emphasize state 
sovereignty are more permissive of genocide within state borders. During the cold war, 
intervention was most likely when genocidal actions threatened to spill over borders (e.g. 
East Pakistan, Uganda). Secondly, international political economy plays a role. Verhoeven 
analyses Sudan’s shift from colonial to post-colonial agricultural exploitation in a globalizing 
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economy. This favors riverain elites and marginalizes Darfuri subsistence farmers 
disconnected from global markets, a factor in their vulnerability to victimization.  
Individual (micro-) level analyses 
A review of the literature on perpetrators shows variation in terms of level of participation 
and role, suggesting that some explanation utilizing individual characteristics is necessary 
(Hollows and Fritzon 2012: 459). Some studies pay close attention to a single perpetrator 
(e.g. Arendt 2006 on Eichmann; Wilson 2010 on Duch), trading off depth against 
generalization. Hollows and Fritzon adopt a larger convenience sample of 80 perpetrators 
tried in international courts (2012: 460). This sampling strategy is hostage to prosecutorial 
choices, but the ICTY has tried suspects from the front line, up through regional and 
organizational hierarchies to top leaders, providing a cross-section of offenders. They 
identify four models of functioning (adaptive, conservative, expressive and integrative) and 
find statistically significant relationships between these and the offending patterns of 
individuals (462-465). For example, the expressive model includes harassment, denigration 
and dehumanization and is associated with individuals with a ‘poorly constructed emotional 
system’, internal instability and a dysfunctional manner of communicating (465).  
Organizational (meso-) level analyses and integrated frameworks 
Integrated analyses recognize that states and organizations depend on individuals to 
execute specific tasks (Collins 2009, 17) and that individuals exist in, and interact with, 
contexts structured by states and intermediate organizations (Haslam and Reicher 2007, 
620). Alvarez locates impetus, ideology and resources in the state; bureaucracies translate 
this into structured practices enacted by individuals (2001, 8). Other forms exist between 
state and individual. Van Baar and Huisman (2012) describe one firm involved in producing 
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ovens for use in Nazi death camps. Tanner and Mulone (2013) identify informal groupings in 
the grey area covering private security and paramilitarism. Studies like these allow 
comparison and go some way towards providing differentiation between different types of 
administrator and administration (Bloxham 2010, 211).  
The medical profession in in Nazi Germany provides an example (Browning 1988; Haque et 
al 2012). Browning gives a detailed account of public health officials’support and 
rationalization of exterminatory policies in occupied Poland. This included concentrating 
Jews in overcrowded and insanitary ghettoes with insufficient food, shooting Jews found 
outside the ghettoes, and ultimately the mass murder of Jews in death camps. The 
enthusiastic participation of doctors is presented as a puzzle by Haque and colleagues. 
Around half of German physicians were “early joiners” of the party, a figure exceeding that 
of any other profession (2012, 473-4). Aside from the clash of values in a profession geared 
towards preserving life, Haque and colleagues observe that German Jews were prevalent in 
the medical profession, so it was likely that many of the non-Jewish German doctors would 
have trained and worked with Jewish colleagues (2012, 473). The authors propose a range 
of explanations that tie together individual characteristics, professional structures and state. 
Firstly, an authoritarian personality was common among doctors (2012, 474). Haslam and 
Reicher suggest that this may not be a product of the organizational environment, but that 
individuals with certain characteristics are more likely to enter particular situations (2007, 
615). Nonetheless, Haslam and Reicher see that both person and situation are altered by 
the interplay. The strict rules of practice in medicine may strengthen tendencies towards 
conformity and authoritarianism (Haslam and Reicher 2007, 615; Haque et al 2012, 475).  
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In terms of the profession’s position in society, Haque and colleagues note that, in a time of 
demoralization in the turbulent economic and political climate following Germany’s defeat 
in war, the profession was overcrowded, and suffered relative economic decline and the 
after effects of wartime deprofessionalization. The Nazi party’s penetration ofstate and 
profession offered a way to remove competitive colleagues and a path towards upward 
social mobility (Haque et al 2012, 476-77). In the Generalgouvernement, by 1941 these 
factors combined with anti-Semitic stereotypes and a mission to preserve the German 
people, justifying “any means” to prevent their endangerment (Browning 1988, 22, 26). 
Organizations and professions select their members, but specialists are drawn from a 
limited pool leading to compromises on ideological criteria. The Warsaw public health 
official Dr. Hagen was “politically unreliable” on account of his involvement in Weimar’s 
leftist politics. Although he sought to counter the spread of disease within the ghetto, he did 
not oppose ghettoization and continued to believe into the 1970s that spotted fever was 
endemic among Jews (Browning 1988, 25). Hagen, once considered as a candidate to be 
imprisoned in a concentration camp, resigned on the grounds of conscience and took up a 
posting in Russia (Browning 1988, 30-31).  
Historical and sociological studies show that any explanation of genocide needs to show 
multilevel processes over the short term (Kluseman 2012; Tanner and Mulone 2013) and the 
long term (Bloxham 2010). In the short term concentration, starvation, and denial of 
hygiene and other public health measures created a self-fulfilling prophecy of disease 
among Jews. This threatened the spread of disease as those detained in the ghetto sought 
to escape their deaths. In turn, this boosted medical support and legitimation for radical 
responses, escalating from shooting Jews found outside the ghettoes to killing them in huge 
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numbers. Against a background of ideological sympathy, the case of the medical profession 
is an example of the Nazi state using professional structures to do what they are best suited 
to, “the harnessing of different individual dispositions and ambitions to the achievement of 
common goals by the provision of various incentives” (Bloxham 2008, 204).  
Prevention and reduction 
States party to the 1948 Genocide Convention undertake to prevent and punish genocide 
(Article 1). Weighing the genocides in table 3 against the limited number of preventive 
interventions, the convention’s success is questionable. A number of reasons have been 
posited, including the lack of institutionalized coercive power to back up the law (Hagan and 
Levi 2005, 1500). Waxman notes a number of coercive interventions, with and without UN 
Security Council backing (2009, 8-9; contrast Haiti and Kosovo), but his cases include Bosnia, 
where the Srebrenica genocide followed UN intervention from the start of the conflict. 
Waxman’s interventions all follow the cold war, a period in which support for different 
client regimes and protection of regional interests blocked the consensus required for 
intervention (Sumner 1982, 2; Totten 2005, 6). This has lessened to some extent, but 
Waxman notes that veto holders with ideological objections to intervention in internal 
affairs, or interest-driven objections to particular interventions, still act obstruct UN Security 
Council consent for military intervention (2009, 12).  
The punishment envisaged by the convention may serve preventive ends. This is the most 
common justification of International Criminal Law, even if supporting evidence is sketchy 
(Tallgren 2002, 565, 569). Tallgren cites deterrence as one preventive model, but also 
highlights the internalization of norms and integration into a system of common values. 
Deterrence may develop over time, inasmuch as classical features of deterrence theory are 
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attained by the institutions of international criminal justice. In the short term, the credible 
threat of prosecutions22 is unlikely to stop crimes in a context already deeply affected by 
hatred and violence (Akhavan 2001, 9), but from the 1990s international criminal law 
extended to include a permanent international criminal court, special courts combining 
international and domestic elements23, domestic trials following regime change, and the use 
of universal jurisdiction over international crimes such as genocide. Rikhof identifies 13 
European states exercising such jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute crimes from 19 
countries (2009, 26-37). This takes place against a background of the thickening of 
institutions of global governance, and the growth of regional and international bodies 
monitoring, regulating or governing states (Cronin 2005, 315; Falk 2001, 118).  
Final remarks 
The chapter does not exhaustively cover the developing field of genocide studies. As it 
continues to develop, we can anticipate a wider range of mid-level studies, the greater 
possibility of comparative work, and, through journals such as Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies, the continued application of different disciplinary frameworks to describe, analyze 
and explain the phenomenon.  
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